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This issue of the Bulletin returns to ongoing work theorizing Africa’s economic development. It zeros in on the debate on Randomised Control 
Trials (RCTs) in the design of development interven-
tions for and in Africa. A resurgent area of western in-
tellectual curiosity and policy initiative, RCTs recently 
attracted renewed attention and unexpected validation 
with the award of the 2019 Nobel Prize in Economics to 
Esther Duflo, Abijit Banerjee and Michael Kremer. This 
trio was awarded the 2019 Nobel Prize for their work in 
adapting the experimental method of RCTs to the de-
sign of development interventions in Africa, and was 
lauded by the Nobel Committee for thus making a ma-
jor contribution to poverty alleviation. This catalysed 
vibrant debates and rebuttal amongst academics, devel-
opment practitioners and public policy experts that con-
tinues to date, including on social media platforms. The 
debates centred around the merits of applying RCTs to 
development thinking in the continent. Consistently, 
interlocuters have sought to contextualise 
the literature on RCTs within the historical 
sociology of knowledge production and 
dissemination, with an emphasis also be-
ing placed on the impact on development 
outcomes.
Beyond whatever signal the Nobel 
Prize sent for research and development 
thinking, the theoretical and ideologi-
cal assumptions RCTs engender remain 
problematic conceptually and method-
ologically. Of course, the use of RCTs 
in the field of biomedicine, for example, 
carries enormous value and has led to re-
sults that sit at the core of scientific ad-
vancement.  Not so for economics where 
critics, even when they acknowledge the 
importance of experimental as opposed to 
observational approaches, caution against 
the tendency to accord RCTs special status.1 “Every dis-
cipline is constituted by what it forbids its practitioners 
to do.”2 At its basic, this injunction that is associated 
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with Nietzsche, limits and represses interdisciplinary 
creativity. But there are instances where deployment of 
methodological tools from one discipline to the other 
is conceptually dangerous and ethically injurious; the 
application of RCTs in research used to design devel-
opment intervention in Africa is a particularly perni-
cious instance.
For some, the application of RCTs in development 
thinking in Africa represents the new gold standard in 
conceptualizing research in economic development. 
For these scholars, replicating RCTs is good science 
and positioning outcomes of RCT research to influence 
the design of development policies is laudable. Those 
who remain sceptical question the design, validity and 
impact of the methodology and perceive in it echoes of 
past experimentations that have only served to distract 
progressive economic thought in Africa. As Grieve 
Chelwa and Nimi Hoffmann demonstrate in this issue 
of the Bulletin, RCTs have significant conceptual and 
design flaws and can be deficient in addressing ques-
tions for which they appear well suited to address.3 
Chelwa and Hoffmann argue that the design of RCTs 
do not take the holistic context in which the poor live 
and end up ignoring the range of factors influencing 
people’s choices. Chelwa, in particular, finds the march 
of development economics into an experimental field 
absolutely problematic. The implications of using re-
sults from this experimental methodology as a basis of 
designing public policies for poverty interventions are 
dangerous at best, given the inadequate appreciation of 
the overall social context, a context that in real life can 
neither be ‘randomised’ nor ‘controlled.’ 
These concerns are not new and have been alive in 
economics for decades. Using Africa to validate or 
invalidate medical assumptions or development inter-
ventions has a well-documented but problematic past. 
The history of using blacks or Africans as guinea pigs 
in experimental medical and anthropological research 
is known. This has previously been the basis for im-
portant ethical questions and concerns, leading most 
research institutions to lay out broad ethical param-
eters against which approval by Institutional Review 
Boards (IRBs) for research involving human subjects 
has to be based. However, even as application of these 
rigorous parameters continues, the research industry 
embeds power relations that find other means to legiti-
mize research interventions and outputs even if these 
do not adhere to standard ethical norms. This puts 
IRBs squarely at the centre, especially because some 
have morphed into gatekeepers that authorise specific, 
well-funded institutions to conduct research in particu-
lar places, while preventing research inquiry into other 
“special” communities. As Angus Deaton notes, even 
in the US, for instance, “nearly all RCTs on the welfare 
system are RCTs done by better-heeled, better-educat-
ed and paler people on lower income, less-educated 
and darker people.”4 In this Bulletin, Nimi Hoffmann 
and Seán M. Muller identify and discuss the ethical 
problems and the dangerous policy consequences of 
RCTs. These are particularly manifest in the alarming 
revelations in Muller’s research on RCTs conducted in 
the field of education in South Africa.
Interestingly, the trust and legitimacy deficits associated 
with RCTs seems to be largely dependent on their use. 
Rosaine N. Yegbemey, in the piece on climate-adapt-
ability in relation to the needs of small-holder farmers 
in the North of Benin, shows that the application of 
RCTs methodology did present positive possibilities, 
providing farmers with climate-adaptability in relations 
to farming needs of smallholder famers in the North of 
Benin the positive possibilities of using RCTs. In this 
specific case, the application of this methodology has 
proven effective in providing farmers with climate-re-
lated information that is useful in influencing adapta-
tion decisions. On the contrary, RCT interventions have 
proven ineffective when there are major trust and le-
gitimacy issues among the subjects of their experiment. 
In her analysis based in western Kenya, Marion Ouma 
illustrates how cash transfer interventions by a private 
organization in Nyanza, Kenya elicited more mistrust 
and resistance compared to transfers done by the gov-
ernment. This resistance to RCT driven cash transfers 
has also been documented in similar cases in other Afri-
can countries like Malawi and Zambia.  
In brief, articles in this issue of the Bulletin assert the 
need to deepen intellectual reflection on conceptual 
and methodological questions relating to the deploy-
ment of RCTs in the social sciences. The ethical ques-
tions the researchers raise require more than a lauda-
tory response. We thank Nimi Hoffmann for proposing 
the special issue and her assistance in facilitating the 
publication of these articles. The French version of 
these articles will be issued later in the year. May this 
also serve as a reminder of the invitation to any African 
academic interested in putting together a special issue 
of CODESRIA Bulletin to please contact the council.
Notes
1. Angus Deaton and Nancy Cartwright, 
“Understanding and misunderstanding randomized 
controlled trials,” in Social Science & Medicine, 
Vol. 210, August 2018, 2-21
2. Hayden White as cited in Keith Jenkins, Re-thinking 
History, London and New York, Routledge, 1991, 
preface.
3. Deaton and Cartwright, “Understanding and 
misunderstanding randomized controlled trials.”
4. Angus Deaton, Randomization in the Tropics 
Revisited: A Theme and Eleven Variations, NBER 
Working Paper No. 27600, http://www.nber.org/
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This article traces the intellec-tual history of development economics from its initial 
preoccupation with the big ques-
tions of industrialisation to its 
current focus on micro-level extra-
market and extra-political interven- 
tions. Whether it is administering 
deworming tablets in Kenya or 
teaching negotiation skills to girls 
in Zambia, this new approach to 
development implicitly promises 
wide-scale transfor-mative develop- 
ment for the adopters of its 
medicine. I argue that the current 
policy prescriptions of the field 
cannot on their own lead to wide-
scale transformative development. 
If anything, the interventions 
called for by the new development 
economists are the results and 
not the causes of transformative 
development. I call for a more 
eclectic approach to development 
economics that largely borrows 
aspects and ambitions of the field’s 
forbearers but grounds itself in 
the specificities of individual 
developing countries. 
I have three objectives in this essay. 
First, I would like to show that the 
practice of development economics 
has gone through two major phases 
over the last 80 years or so from its 
formal birth in the 1940s. Second, I 
will argue that the current practice 
of development economics, as 
encapsulated in the intellectual 
labour and policy prescriptions 
of the 2019 economics Nobelists 
(Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and 
Michael Kremer) and their disciples, 
cannot on its own lead to wide-scale 
transformative development of the 
kind we have come to associate with 
the now industrialised countries. If 
anything, the kind of development 
interventions that the trio’s work 
calls for are likely to be the results 
of transformative development and 
not its cause. My conclusion here 
holds, even if Banerjee et al. were to 
resolve, by some deus ex machina, 
all the myriad concerns about 
internal validity, external validity 
and research ethics that have been 
levelled at their methods (Deaton 
2010; Muller 2015; Hoffmann 
2019). Lastly, I will argue for a more 
eclectic approach to development 
economics that largely borrows 
aspects and ambitions of the field’s 
forbearers but grounds itself in the 
specificities (history, politics, etc.) 
of individual developing countries. 
In its initial incarnation in the 
1940s, development economics was 
concerned with the big question of 
how to fundamentally transform 
the economies of the then ‘Third 
World’. Albert Hirschman, himself 
a pioneer of the field, writes that 
‘development economics started out 
as the spearhead of an effort that was 
to bring all-around emancipation 
from backwardness’ (2013: 69). In 
this initial formulation, development 
unequivocally meant sustained 
increases in income per head. And 
the vehicle that was to deliver 
this was industrialisation. The 
early pioneers (Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan, Ragnar Nurkse, W. Arthur 
Lewis, Kurt Mandelbaum, Albert 
Hirschman, among others) all agreed 
that the process of industrialisation 
required an omnipresent state to 
not only address market failures, 
which were said to be endemic in 
the developing world, but to also 
engage in entrepreneurial ventures. 
Much of the intellectual debates at 
the time were split between those 
who believed that industrialisation 
required a ‘big push’ along a 
‘balanced growth’ path (Rosenstein-
Rodan, Nurkse, and Lewis to some 
extent) and those who believed that 
‘unbalanced’ sectoral linkages were 
key to industrialisation (Hirschman). 
These were the halcyon days of 
classical development economics. 
From the early to mid-1970s, a 
crisis of confidence arose within 
development economics as a result 
of the many false industrialisation 
starts in the developing world. 
Countries that should have been 
well on their way to ‘take-off’ did 
not do so and those that had taken 
off crashed only moments after. 
The growing mathematisation of 
economics that was well underway 
at the time meant that the pioneers 
of development economics, many 
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of whom were not trained in the new 
orthodoxy, could not adequately 
respond to the charge levelled by 
neoclassical economists that false 
starts were the result of government-
inspired resource misallocations. 
Further, neo-marxists pointed out 
that rather than bridge inequalities, 
as hypothesised by the classical 
development economists, whatever 
little industrialisation that had 
taken place had had the actual 
effect of deepening intra- and 
inter-country inequalities. Lastly, 
many of the efforts towards 
industrialisation were said to have 
happened at the expense of political 
and democratic progress under 
authoritarian regimes, aspects that 
had been completely neglected by 
the first generation development 
economists.1 All these factors, 
according to Hirschman (2013), 
resulted in the decline of develop-
ment economics, at least in its 
classic vintage. 
By the 1980s many poor countries 
were in the grips of economic crises. 
In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, 
the World Bank traced the origin 
of the crisis to the economy-wide 
distortions that had partly been 
inspired by the work of development 
economists (World Bank 1981). 
The prescription of the World 
Bank and other allied institutions 
was, therefore, straight forward: 
poor countries, especially those 
in sub-Saharan Africa, needed to 
structurally adjust their economies 
in favour of market-based 
allocations coupled with a minimal 
role for the state. However, by the 
1990s it had become apparent that 
structural adjustment had been the 
wrong prescription for the wrong 
crisis (Mkandawire and Soludo 
1998). Many African countries 
had implemented the requirements 
of structural adjustment with 
devastating results, especially for 
the poor.2 
At the start of the twenty-first 
century, the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) came to the 
position that the singular focus 
on markets inherent in structural 
adjustment policies (SAPs) had 
adversely impacted the lives of 
the poor. Thus, they now required 
governments in Africa to prepare 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) that were to articulate 
how governments would protect 
the welfare of the poor. However, 
the IFIs and many in the donor 
community still held the view that 
statist policies were to blame for 
the crisis. These views were heavily 
influenced by work coming out of 
the ‘neo-patrimonial school’ that 
used an incredible array of epithets 
(‘tribal’, ‘corrupt’, ‘cronyistic’, 
‘parasitic’, et cetera) to describe 
the bankruptcy of the African state 
(Mkandawire 2015).  
It is into this milieu that today’s 
mainstream version of development 
economics was born. The donor 
community, given the incompetence 
of the African state, insisted on 
the direct provision of aid to 
needy communities. Government 
involvement in this process, if 
any at all, was to be kept to a bare 
minimum. Thus began the era of 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and Project Aid. 
Inspired by the Millennium Develop- 
ment Goals (MDGs), donors 
identified micro-interventions in 
mostly health and education as these 
were considered to be important 
inputs into development. The large 
infusions into Project Aid, however, 
required rigorous evaluations to 
figure out ‘what works’ (Duflo 
and Kremer 2008). Knowing what 
works is not only important for 
the purposes of accounting for tax 
dollars on the part of donors, but for 
the transplanting of this knowledge 
to other settings in the developing 
world. Mainstream economists, 
armed with the tools of credible 
causal identification (Angrist and 
Pischke 2010), were particularly 
suited for this challenge. Thus they 
formed a symbiotic relationship 
whereby donors supplied financial 
resources and economists provided 
credible answers as to which 
interventions worked. And to do 
this, economists carved out for 
themselves ‘islands of normalcy’ 
in the developing world (i.e. 
places that were insulated from 
the neo-patrimonial urges of the 
state) to run their development 
experiments with local NGOs 
as their favoured implementing 
partners. Development economics 
was no longer concerned with 
the large macro-question of how 
to permanently increase income 
per head but with micro-level 
questions around whether certain 
interventions (mosquito nets, 
deworming tablets, iodised salt, 
teaching negotiation skills to girls, 
et cetera) improved some narrow 
measure of the poor’s welfare. 
This reorientation of the field of 
development economics towards 
micro-level concerns betrays 
a complete misunderstanding 
of what is commonly meant by 
development. In saying this I am 
not disputing the claim that some 
of the micro-level interventions 
favoured by the new development 
economists do alleviate some of 
the poor’s hardships (of course 
I am abstracting here from the 
still unresolved questions about 
internal and external validity, et 
cetera). However, the argument is 
that the favoured interventions of 
the new development economists 
are in no way the sine qua non 
of development. At best, these 
interventions act as a feel-good 
tourniquet meant to temporarily 
alleviate suffering much like 
humanitarian assistance. And 
as Deaton (2013) has argued in 
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the case of Britain, spectacular 
improvements in well-being (as 
measured by, say, life expectancy) 
in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries followed 
increases in the general level of 
incomes in the economy. Increased 
incomes, in turn, accorded the 
authorities the resources needed 
to invest in large-scale public 
sanitation infrastructure. This is 
also what has characterised the 
Chinese experience over the last 
30 years. The new development 
economists are guilty of putting the 
cart before the horse.        
There is a pressing need for develop-
ment economics to reconnect 
with its historical ambition and 
preoccupation of thinking through 
the mechanisms that are likely to 
permanently and fundamentally 
transform the lives of the poor. 
And as Rodrik (2008) argues, some 
of the empirical skills in the new 
development economists’ toolkits 
can be helpful here.3 These will, 
however, have to be combined 
with other methods of knowing 
complete with multidisciplinary 
approaches (history, politics, 
et cetera) that dig deep into the 
experiences of individual countries. 
Mkandawire (2001) shows that 
many African countries scored a 
lot of progress in the first 20 years 
after independence and mostly 
on the back of industrialisation. 
Serious minds are needed to deduce 
yesterday’s lessons for today’s 
development challenges. 
Notes
1. The experience of W. Arthur Lewis 
as economic advisor to Kwame 
Nkrumah in newly independent 
Ghana is illustrative of this point 
(see Tignor 2006). 
2. Van De Walle (2001) argues that 
structural adjustment policies 
(SAPs) did not succeed in the case of 
Africa because many governments 
did not actually implement them. 
The careful work of Mkandawire 
and Soludo (1998) shows that many 
African governments actually went 
even further in their implementation 
of SAPs than what was required 
by the international financial 
institutions.    
3. See for example Lane’s (2019) 
survey of the ‘new empirics of 
industrial policy’.
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This book provides an analysis of the 
ecological conditions and ecosystem 
goods and services of the Zambezi 
River Basin (ZRB), the fourth largest 
river in Africa. Various environmental 
and anthropogenic factors; inclusive of 
climate, environmental flows, hydrol-
ogy, morphology, pollution and land 
use changes among others and their 
interactions are considered as drivers 
of the river ecosystems. The impacts 
of these drivers on aquatic biota, river 
ecological integrity, and the livelihoods 
of surrounding communities are anal-
ysed within the socio-economic-policy 
context. The book goes beyond the 
usual inventories and basic research 
by using the comparative research 
method (CRM) in a trans-disciplinary 
manner. This CRM analytical approach in this book seeks to interrogate the differences or similarities in socio-
economic systems, livelihoods, ecological systems, ecosystem goods and services, their usage and management 
under the seemingly different cultural, socio-economic conditions expected across boarders that are within the 
ZRB. The multidisciplinary approach also connects the typical ecological research with social dimensions in a ho-
listic manner. The book therefore, provides empirical and research based evidence to support strategic planning 
and policy development in the wake of ecological changes that nations and indeed regions such as the ZRB are 
grappling with while seeking to sustainably manage precious river systems.
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In 2019 the Sveriges Riksbank Prize (‘Nobel’ prize) in Econo-mics was awarded for the use 
of experiments to evaluate social 
policy interventions in former 
colonies. These social experiments, 
the Nobel Committee (2019) 
claims, have ‘helped to alleviate 
global poverty’ and have ‘the 
potential to further improve the 
lives of the worst-off people around 
the world’. It is striking then, that 
the award makes no mention of 
the ethics of experimentation 
on highly vulnerable people. In 
this piece, I revisit the evidence 
I gathered on informed consent 
in social experiments in former 
colonies, which suggests that many 
studies face serious problems 
with informed consent (Hoffmann 
2020). My intention is to show that 
involuntary experimentation is an 
important ethical and intellectual 
issue for Southern scholars.
The argument is composed of 
four moves. First, I explain how 
the design of many experiments 
pose serious obstacles to informed 
consent. Second, I  aim to show 
that involuntary experimentation 
on vulnerable people in former 
colonies is unethical: it violates 
their personhood, increases the 
risk of unintended harm, and 
establishes continuities with 
colonial experimentation. Third, 
I engage with objections that 
informed consent is unnecessary, 
and that the demand for informed 
consent in social experimentation is 
an illegitimate infringement on the 
sovereignty of the state. I argue that 
these objections are unjustified, 
and that informed consent is a 
central component of democratic 
social policy. As a result, instead 
of strengthening social policy, 
involuntary experimentation wea-
kens it. Fourth, I aim to show that 
the political economy dynamics of 
social experimentation mean that 
existing regulatory mechanisms 
are likely to be ineffective. 
However, social experimentation 
is still a relatively low-stakes 
enterprise compared with medical 
experimentation, and there is 
therefore a window of opportunity 
to develop more effective 
regulation. In light of this, Southern 
scholars have a clear responsibility 
to call for a moratorium on social 
experiments and to participate in 
establishing more effective ethical 
safeguards. 
Obstacles to informed 
consent
I begin by revisiting the evidence 
on informed consent. The evidence 
comes from a systematic review 
of all randomised controlled 
trials (RCTs) published between 
2009 and 2014 in ‘top economics 
journals’ that had been previously 
conducted by Peters et al. (2016). 
I used their review because it 
indicates the standards of journals 
considered to be the most rigorous 
in the discipline.
In the original article, I focused on 
experiments conducted in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America (58 out 
of a total of 92 studies). To extract 
information on informed consent, 
I used a minimalist criterion: 
participants knew they were in 
some sort of study before agreeing 
to participate. This did not require 
them to know that they were in an 
experiment, or to know the details 
of the experiment before consenting 
to participate. By this criterion, 
78 per cent of authors did not 
discuss informed consent, 12 per 
cent stated that participants were 
intentionally left ignorant, and 10 
per cent indicated informed consent 
for some sort of study. However, no 
study indicated whether participants 
were explicitly aware that they 
were being experimented upon. 
(Table 1). This silence on informed 
consent, and in some cases explicit 
denial thereof, suggests that it is 
considered less important than 
other elements of the experimental 
design.
Involuntary Social Experimentation:  
Revisiting the Case for a Moratorium
Nimi Hoffmann
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However, the experimental 
design of many of these studies 
presents serious obstacles to 
informed consent. One barrier 
concerns the practice of randomly 
allocating treatments to clusters, 
such as schools or clinics. Cluster 
randomisation often makes 
informed consent unfeasible 
(Lignou 2018). This is because it 
may be costly to leave the service of 
the implementing agency (such as 
switching schools), or participants 
may be locked into the service 
(such as relying on social welfare), 
or the service may be the cheapest 
or most convenient option (such as 
using the closest clinic). Although 
64 per cent of the studies employed 
cluster randomisation, no study 
discussed whether participants 
could not opt out because it was 
costly to leave the cluster, and how 
this was addressed. 
A second barrier to consent concerns 
the vulnerability of participants. 
Sixteen per cent of studies used 
children as participants, yet only 
one study explicitly gained the 
consent of parents. Twenty-
four per cent used institutional 
settings, such as clinics or schools, 
but no study discussed whether 
participants believed they would 
suffer professional consequences if 
they refused to participate and how 
this was addressed. And nearly all 
the studies involved the allocation 
of scarce resources to impoverished 
participants, but no study discussed 
whether penury compelled people 
to participate and how this was 
dealt with. 
By design then, it appears that 
most of the studies in the review 
had serious built-in obstacles 
to informed consent. I discuss 
methodological reasons for suspen- 
ding informed consent below, 
but first I consider the ethical 
implications of involuntary 
experimentation.
The ethics of informed 
consent
The suspension of informed 
consent on vulnerable people is 
consequential. First, it raises the 
distinction between treating humans 
as persons who have a right to 
participate or not as they so choose, 
versus treating them as subjects 
to be manipulated for research 
purposes. (Barrett and Carter 
2010: 520). It is for this reason that 
informed consent was incorporated 
into the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights as one 
of the ‘inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family . . . 
derive[d] from the inherent dignity 
of the human person.’ (UN General 
Assembly 1966). This framing casts 
the absence of informed consent as 
a violation of personhood in and 
of itself, outside of any negative 
consequences it enables. Seen this 
way, involuntary experimentation 
arguably violates the personhood 
of some of the world’s most 
vulnerable people – impoverished 
black and brown people, many of 
whom are women.
Second, it increases the risk of 
unintentional harm. If participants 
are aware of the true nature of the 
intervention, its risks and trade-offs, 
they may be able to alert experi-
mentalists to unintended negative 
consequences. This is important 
for experiments that allocate 
critical resources, such as income 
or healthcare, to impoverished 
people. Withholding or providing 
resources to particular groups may 
harm vulnerable groups or catalyse 
contestations that are socially 
destabilising (Acemoglu 2010). 
The principle is a general one: while 
each individual has rich, complex 
and deep knowledge about herself, 
experimentalists necessarily have 
sparse and inadequate knowledge 
about participants (otherwise 
they would have no reason to 
study them). Since all social 
experiments are characterised by 
information asymmetries between 
experimentalists and participants, 
experimentalists do not fully 
Table 1: Features of experiments in former colonies related to informed consent
 % not stated % no % yes Total
Participants consented to participate in some sort of study 78 12 10 100 
Participants aware that they were in an experiment 100 0 0 100
Cluster randomisation 0 36 64 100 
Institutional setting 0 76 24 100
Impoverished participants 0 3 97 100
Child participants 0 84 16 100
Addresses design constraints on ability to opt out 100 0 0 100
Approved by university ethical review board 91 0 9 100 
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know what harms they may cause. 
Insofar as informed consent allows 
participants the opportunity to 
reduce experimentalists’ ignorance, 
it plays an invaluable role in 
reducing the risk of harm.
Third, the suspension of informed 
consent increases the risk of 
establishing historical continuities 
with colonial experimentation. 
While many colonial 
experimentalists hoped to help the 
lives of the poor and contribute to 
science, their experimentation was 
often involuntary and harmful, 
and had the effect of positioning 
entire regions as though they 
were ‘living laboratories’ in 
which scientific curiosity and 
the urge for beneficence could 
be satisfied (Tilley 2011). Stark 
regional asymmetries in authorship 
heighten this risk (Table 2). Of the 
experiments conducted in former 
colonies in the literature review, 
84 per cent of lead authors were at 
institutions in the United States or 
Western Europe. No first authors 
were located in Africa or Latin 
America, and only 5 per cent were 
in Asia. 
Table 2: First author location of experiments conducted in former colonies
Dealing with objections
The suspension of informed 
consent in social experiments is 
typically a response to the problem 
of external validity, or the ability 
to apply the findings outside the 
context of the study to another 
place or time (Barrett and Carter 
2010). If participants know that 
they are in an experiment then they 
may behave differently than they 
would under non-experimental 
conditions, so that the outcomes of 
an intervention might not scale-up 
to a population. Yet the standard 
solution in medical research – 
assigning a placebo – is not possible 
in most social experiments (Peters, 
Langbein, and Roberts 2016). 
Thus, there is a prima facie ‘greater 
good’ argument for violating 
informed consent – it helps ensure 
the external validity of experiments 
in order to contribute evidence for 
more beneficial policies.
With or without informed consent, 
however, social experiments 
face serious problems of external 
validity. The effects observed in the 
sample are unlikely to be similar to 
the effects in the population due to 
general equilibrium and political 
economy effects (Heckman 1992; 
Moffitt 1992; Deaton 2010; 
2010), while the perception that 
experiments are non-parametric 
and theory-free is inconsistent with 
claims to generalisability (Muller 
2015; Deaton and Cartwright 
2016). And even if experimental 
results could generalise to different 
people or times, this assumes that 
experiments lead to more beneficial 
policies than alternative forms of 
research. This is a counterfactual 
claim for which no experimental 
evidence has yet been forthcoming 
(Chelwa and Muller 2019). Indeed, 
the role of medical experiments 
in harmful outcomes, such as the 
opioid crisis, cautions against 
strong claims about policy benefits 
(Deaton forthcoming). Thus, 
appeals to external validity do not 
address concerns about suspending 
informed consent; instead they 
simply shift the terrain to even 
thornier methodological issues 
regarding external validity and 
uncertainty.
Defendants of involuntary experi- 
mentation might instead argue 
that the potential harms of 
social experimentation are 
trivial in comparison to medical 
experimentation, and that indeed, 
the potential benefits of suspending 
informed consent outweigh its 
harms. Singer et al. (2019) provide 
the following analogy to advance 
this utilitarian argument:
The philosopher Derek Parfit 
asks whether a person trapped 
in a collapsing building may 
break an unconscious stranger’s 





Latin America 0 0
United States 39 67
World Bank 6 10
Other 0 0
Total 58 100
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life. Most agree that ‘using’ the 
stranger in this way is ethically 
permissible. Similarly, RCTs 
have occasionally identified 
interventions that are tens or 
even thousands of times more 
effective than others. 
However, this is a poor analogy. 
The example of the trapped person 
involves just three people in a 
tightly circumscribed scenario. 
Social experiments typically 
involve large numbers of people 
in porous and complex social 
settings. In the systematic review 
discussed above, the majority of 
studies had sample sizes ranging 
from thousands of individuals to 
millions of households (Peters, 
Langbein and Roberts 2016). This 
complexity and scale necessarily 
involve information asymmetries 
between experimentalists and 
participants. Thus, not only are the 
potential harms not fully knowable, 
but the potential benefits as well. A 
utilitarian argument requires some 
knowledge about the possible harms 
and benefits of an action in order to 
weigh them against each other. Yet 
the very mechanism by which better 
information about prospective 
harms and benefits could be derived 
– informed consent – is ruled out by 
appeal to the supposedly beneficial 
consequences. The utilitarian 
argument against informed consent 
falters on the grounds of circularity.
Another line of defence is to appeal 
to the fact that social experiments 
typically piggyback on existing 
interventions conducted by govern- 
ments, NGOs or firms. Thus, 
if interventions are going to 
be imposed unilaterally, then 
social experimentalists may as 
well gain knowledge from these 
interventions, which can be used 
to identify any harms (Singer, 
Baker and Haushoffer 2019). This 
echoes a well-established view 
that all social policy interventions 
are experiments, but the point 
is to make the knowledge from 
these interventions socially useful. 
Writing in 1938, for instance, the 
British social theorist Beatrice 
Webb argued: 
All administration, whether from 
the motive of profit-making 
or from that of public service, 
whether of the factory or the 
mine, of the elementary school 
or the post office, of the co-
operative society or the Trade 
Union . . . necessarily amounts to 
nothing less than ‘experimenting 
in the lives of other people.’ 
(Cited in Oakley 2000: 318.) 
The difference is that social experi-
ments unveil the cloak of secrecy 
in government interventions and 
therefore make useful contributions 
to knowledge. However, as 
early proponents of ‘reforms as 
experiments’ recognised, this does 
not entail suspending the principle 
of informed consent, for doing 
so evades personal responsibility 
(Campbell 1969; Campbell and 
Russo 1999). This version of the 
argument is weak, because it relies 
on buck-passing.
A stronger version of this argument 
is that it is inconsistent to require 
social experimentalists to gain 
informed consent, when one does 
not require the implementing 
agency, and particularly govern-
ments, to gain informed consent 
(MacKay and Chakrabarti 2019; 
Meyer et al. 2019). This is an 
important demand for consistency. 
But instead of waiving the 
principle of informed consent for 
experimentalists, as these authors 
suggest, there are strong reasons to 
insist on a consistent commitment 
to informed consent. 
The first reason concerns the problem 
of asymmetrical information. If 
governments and NGOs ought 
to ensure the well-being of the 
people they serve, then informed 
consent is an important mechanism 
by which they can reduce their 
ignorance of the harms and benefits 
of social policy interventions. 
From this perspective, informed 
consent is an important component 
of strengthening the ability of 
governments and NGOs to benefit 
people.
The second reason applies 
particularly to governments that 
claim legitimacy on the grounds 
that they represent the will of the 
people they govern. MacKay and 
Chakrabarti (2019) argue that 
legitimate governments do not 
need to gain informed consent in 
social experiments, because policy 
programming is part of their ‘right 
to rule’. On this view: 
Individual residents are 
legitimately sovereign over those 
spheres of action protected by 
their right to autonomy, and 
governments are legitimately 
sovereign over those spheres of 
action protected by their right 
to rule. Provided they respect 
the limits of their right to rule, 
governments do not therefore 
infringe their residents’ rights 
to autonomy by engaging in 
policy making. (MacKay and 
Chakrabarti 2019: 5) 
As they acknowledge, this assumes 
‘governments and their residents 
possess mutually exclusive spheres 
of sovereignty’. This reasoning in 
manifest in the Belmont Report 
(National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects 
of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research 1978), which waives the 
requirement for informed consent 
in experiments conducted by the 
United States government.
Yet this is a thin model of democracy. 
It implies that democratic 
participation should be limited to 
sporadic voting, and is consistent 
with autocratic governance, so long 
as autocracy is limited to the period 
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between elections. It also assumes 
that an elected government is 
viewed with equal legitimacy by 
all residents. But the legitimacy of 
a government is in part a function 
of the ways in which it treats its 
residents. The Belmont Report 
was published just six years after 
the Tuskegee Study of Untreated 
Syphilis on unconsenting black 
men concluded (Washington 2006). 
It was followed a decade later by 
a government-funded trial which 
forcibly administered a lethal 
drug to black and Latino orphans 
who were HIV positive. The trial 
only concluded in 2001 (Yearby 
2016). A blanket assertion about 
the legitimacy of a government, 
and its sovereign right to withhold 
consent, elides struggles over who 
has the right to be treated as human. 
In doing so, it fails to take into 
account the harms a government 
might inflict on people it implicitly 
deems to be less than human.
The claim that governments and 
their residents inhabit mutually 
exclusive spheres of sovereignty 
is also at odds with the everyday 
practice of democratic governance. 
Governments plausibly derive 
their legitimacy in part from their 
openness to residents’ participation in 
policymaking and implementation. 
This includes consultation with 
residents regarding prospective 
law making, residents actively 
participating in and sometimes 
resisting law-making through legal 
challenges and political action, and 
residents monitoring and evaluating 
policy implementation in order to 
hold government to account. These 
activities are all tied to the spirit 
of informed consent. Making this 
principle explicit is not at odds 
with a government’s right to rule. 
On the contrary, it would appear to 
embody it.
However, this does not imply a 
dogmatic and unyielding insistence 
on the principle of informed consent. 
To do so would be to deny historical 
context and unequal power relations. 
A government raising taxes on the 
wealthy is a different matter from 
the government raising taxes on the 
poor. We might with reason believe 
that the protestations of the wealthy 
have a less legitimate claim on the 
government than the complaints 
of the poor, since the former fight 
for privilege, while the latter fight 
to survive. Similarly, it is common 
to relax the requirements for 
informed consent when conducting 
experiments to investigate powerful 
actors who engage in unethical or 
illegal behaviour, such as racial 
discrimination or money-laundering 
(Findley and Nielson 2015). 
In both research and governance 
then, informed consent ideally 
functions as a baseline principle 
for protecting the most vulnerable 
and can only be waived with 
strong contextual justification. 
In governance especially, it is a 
constitutive element of legitimate 
rule – it is the thread used to stitch 
together the social compact between 
government and its residents, out of 
which a democratic social policy is 
woven. 
Considered carefully then, the 
violation of informed consent in 
social experiments is incoherent. 
Social experiments manifestly aim 
to make a positive contribution to 
social policy. Yet, the violation 
of informed consent undermines 
the realisation of a democratic 
social policy. This is the political 
argument against involuntary 
experimentation: that it constitutes 
a prima facie threat to democratic 
social policy.
The case for a moratorium
All of the experiments in the 
systematic review were published 
in prestigious journals, and while 
none of them mentioned any 
form of ethical review, they were 
presumably approved by their 
universities’ institutional review 
boards. This suggests that the 
mechanisms for regulating social 
experimentation are ineffective. 
Weak regulation is likely a function 
of the political economy of social 
experimentation. Over the last two 
decades, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the use of experiments 
to evaluate the outcomes of social 
policy interventions in former 
colonies. One of the key drivers 
of this increase is the Abdul 
Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab 
(J-PAL), which was founded by 
two of the 2019 Nobel laureates, 
Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee. 
Since its inception in 2003, J-PAL 
has posted 876 social experiments 
in 80 countries, where the largest 
proportion were conducted in 
African countries (Jatteau 2018). 
While J-PAL is not transparent about 
its finances, by some estimates it 
received around US$300 million 
between 2003 and 2018 (Servet 
2018). This funding comes from 
a range of institutions such as the 
World Bank, the UK’s Department 
for International Development and 
the Gates Foundation. And J-PAL’s 
footprint is set to grow with the 
Nobel Prize, which has not only 
served to deepen the prestige of 
social experimentation in general 
and their institute in particular, 
but has also allowed the laureates 
to source an additional US$50 
million in donor funding to extend 
J-PAL’s programme worldwide 
to institutions and researchers in 
former colonies (Kremer 2019).
Indeed, it appears that J-PAL has 
been influential in the World Bank, 
which has been a key driver of 
social experimentation, as both 
a project and research funder, 
and as a thinktank. In 2005, the 
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Bank commissioned a research 
evaluation headed by Banerjee, 
which condemned the Bank’s 
projects for lacking rigorous 
impact evaluation (cited in Jatteau 
2018). This view was echoed by 
the Evaluation Gap Working Group 
(2006), which included authors 
from J-PAL, and development 
actors, such as the World Bank and 
the Gates Foundation. That same 
year, the World Bank established 
a dedicated impact evaluation unit 
(DIME) composed of former J-PAL 
associates to conduct RCTs. The 
number of RCTs used in World 
Bank evaluations subsequently 
increased from a baseline of zero 
in the year 2000 to just over two-
thirds of all evaluations in 2010 
(Bédécarrats, Guérin and Roubaud 
2019).
This shift in World Bank policy 
has accompanied changes 
more generally in international 
development policy to focus on 
results-based management. These 
guidelines were formulated in the 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and reiterated by all 
the major conferences on official 
development assistance in Accra 
in 2008, Busan in 2011 and Addis 
Ababa in 2015 (Bédécarrats, Guérin 
and Roubaud 2019). Since then, a 
number of dedicated RCT funding 
agencies have been established. The 
Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund 
was founded in 2007, the Global 
Agriculture and Food Securi- 
ty Program in 2009, and the Impact 
Evaluation to Development Impact 
in 2014.
This suggests that social experimen-
tation has rapidly become a multi-
national enterprise, one with signifi-
cant financial and political interests. 
It is also a high prestige activity, 
one with ivy league universities 
in the United States at the centre 
of the research network (Jatteau 
2016). The combination of these 
factors has likely helped J-PAL 
develop a model of policy influence 
that focuses on driving demand 
by ‘co-creating’ experiments with 
governments, NGOs and funders 
(Gyamfi and Park 2019). As a result, 
key institutions, which might have 
held experimentalists accountable, 
are no longer at arm’s length 
from the research and their will to 
enforce ethics may be undermined 
by a conflict of interests (Hoffmann 
2018).
Given these constraints, existing 
models for regulating experiments 
are likely incapable of being 
effective. It is difficult for national 
entities to regulate multinational 
industries. It is not easy for poor 
countries or universities to veto 
unethical experiments by donors or 
wealthy Northern universities. And 
it is challenging to make the case 
for caution in an international policy 
context enthusiastically advoca- 
ting experimentation as the gold 
standard. As such, ensuring ethical 
experimentation will likely require 
new models of regulation, which 
involve Southern scholars and 
governments working collabora- 
tively. 
It is within this context that the 
experimental economist Sarin 
(2019) has urged the 2019 Nobel 
laureates to call for halting all 
experiments on vulnerable people 
until effective ethical safeguards 
are established. This is an important 
intervention, but it fails to account 
for the responsibilities of Southern 
scholars to our societies and 
elides the role that Southern 
scholars have played in enabling 
unethical experimentation. It is 
our responsibility to insist that 
experiments in our societies follow 
rigorous ethical protocols, and 
we should be at the forefront of 
ensuring this is enforced. This does 
not imply that Northern scholars 
have no responsibility to prevent 
unethical experimentation, but it 
is with our own conduct that I am 
concerned.
The prospects for more effective 
regulation of social experiments 
look bright in comparison 
to medical experimentation. 
According to one estimate, between 
2007 and 2017, 360 million people 
participated in a registered clinical 
trial (Narita 2019). In comparison, 
only 22 million people were 
enrolled in social experiments (in 
disciplines such as economics, 
political science, and psychology). 
The sheer scale of medical 
experimentation suggests that there 
are substantially greater financial 
and political obstacles to effective 
regulation when compared with 
social experimentation.
In light of this, I believe Southern 
scholars have three clear responsi- 
bilities. First, we have a duty 
to call for a moratorium on 
experimentation until effective 
regulatory mechanisms are esta- 
blished. Second, we have an obligation 
to understand the constraints on 
effective regulation. In this regard, 
we have much to learn from medical 
scholars, who have long grappled 
with unethical experimentation. 
And third, we have a responsibility 
to resist unethical experimentation 
and participate in establishing 
effective ethical safeguards. These 
social responsibilities flow from 
our intellectual freedoms, as 
CODESRIA’s community has long-
recognised (Diouf and Mamdani 
1994). For intellectual freedom 
is not merely a negative freedom 
from constraints. It is also a positive 
freedom to serve. Defining and 
enforcing the proper bounds of 
social experimentation is crucial 
to upholding the dignity of some 
of our most vulnerable people, 
reducing the risk of harm, and 
mitigating continuities with colonial 
experimentation. It is also a small, 
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but important step in reclaiming the 
intellectual project of democratic 
social policy, and indeed, as Chelwa 
and Muller argue in this issue, 
the broader intellectual project of 
development.
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Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are supposedly an important tool in reducing 
world poverty and contributing to 
economic and social development. 
On close scrutiny, the basis for that 
claim turns out to be remarkably 
weak. Worse, and in marked 
contrast to the hype about this 
methodological approach, there 
are substantive reasons to believe 
that the use of RCTs could in fact 
be harmful to the prospects and 
well-being of Africans and African 
countries.
This short article elaborates on 
these concerns as follows.1 The first 
section discusses some fundamental 
methodological limitations of 
RCTs and the resultant intellectual 
inconsistency of the proponents 
of this approach. This shows how 
the randomista project is flawed 
on its own terms. The second 
section then discusses how pre-
existing views and biases, whether 
ideological or about how social 
and economic processes work, 
contradict the framing of RCTs as 
a neutral scientific endeavour. The 
final section briefly illustrates these 
arguments with two important 
examples from South Africa where, 
I suggest, the randomista approach 
has done, and continues to do, 
significant harm. 
An overview of 
methodological limitations
RCTs are a method for obtaining 
quantitative estimates of causal 
effects, and their use for drug trials 
in medical contexts is well-known. 
The deployment of RCTs to address 
social and economic questions is 
not straightforward and may even 
be unethical in many cases (see 
Hoffmann, this issue). Beyond 
that, however, one could argue 
that as a different methodological 
emphasis in intellectual inquiry, 
RCTs are ‘mostly harmless’ 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
But what is characteristic of the 
dramatic increase in the use of this 
method in economics are assertions 
of methodological superiority in 
the policy realm and a deliberate 
effort to obtain influence (Banerjee 
2007; Banerjee and Duflo 2009; 
2011). It is this latter project that 
was recently awarded the 2019 
Nobel Prize in Economics (Nobel 
Media 2019) and the proponents of 
which I refer to, following others 
(Ravallion 2009; 2018; Deaton 
2010), as ‘randomistas’.
Randomised Trials as a Dead-end for African Development
Seán M. Muller
School of Economics 
University of Johannesburg 
South Africa 
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The basic argument of the 
randomista project goes something 
like this:
1. We need reliable, quantitative 
estimates of causal effects to 
make the right policy decisions.
2. The assumptions required by 
other econometric methods 
to obtain such estimates are 
implausible.
3. Simple analysis using an RCT 
can identify the effects of policy 
interest without requiring prior 
knowledge.
4. Therefore, RCTs herald a 
‘credibility revolution’ (Angrist 
and Pischke 2010) in economics 
and should be prioritised by 
policymakers seeking simple 
answers to important questions. 
Every component of the argument 
is contested and has been the 
subject of substantive criticism, 
but for present purposes I focus 
on one fatal contradiction at the 
core of advocating RCTs for 
development policy.
Even if RCTs do actually identify 
causal effects, direct policy 
relevance requires going from an 
empirical finding in an experimental 
population to recommending an 
intervention in a broader population 
that is the one policymakers are 
concerned with.2 And the main 
obstacle to doing so is that the 
causal effect of an intervention 
rarely, if ever, exists in isolation: 
it depends on the characteristics of 
people and context in which it is 
implemented. Or in other words: 
the causal effect of an intervention 
depends on its interaction with 
other factors. Those factors 
may vary across time as well as 
geographical space, so that even in 
the experimental population there 
would be a different outcome five 
years later.
While this is quite intuitive, 
and was pointed out by the first 
authors to systematically consider 
the problem in relation to social 
experiments (Cook and Campbell 
1979), it presents a serious 
dilemma for randomistas. If the 
causal effect depends on other 
factors, then to extrapolate it to 
a different population requires 
knowing what the relevant factors 
are and having data to see how they 
differ across the two populations. 
But the methodological argument 
for RCTs is that assumptions about 
causal structure, used by non-
experimental methods to obtain 
supposedly causal estimates, are 
not credible. 
This argument can be formalised to 
show (Muller 2015) that by simply 
asserting, rather than establishing, 
that the results of RCTs apply to 
broader populations the rando-
mistas endorse an assumption with 
the exact same structure as the one 
they reject when it comes to non-
experimental methods. At best this 
is intellectually inconsistent, at 
worst it is fundamentally dishonest 
– either way it constitutes a fatal 
flaw at the heart of the randomista 
project (Muller 2020).
Although the extent of the 
problem has not been adequately 
acknowledged – in the sense of 
refraining from making policy 
recommendations or promises about 
policy relevance – some indirect 
solutions have been proposed.3 One 
of these of particular interest is that 
practitioners of randomised trials 
use their ‘expertise’ to assess when/
whether experimental results can be 
applied in other populations. The 
invocation of qualitative expertise, 
not least within a broader stance 
of imitative scientism, will surely 
interest many readers who are 
familiar with the historical disdain 
shown by economists towards 
qualitative methods and claims 
based on individual expertise 
rather than ‘data’, ‘models’ and 
‘econometrics’. But it also does 
nothing to resolve the intellectual 
contradiction, since if qualitative 
expertise can be used to decide 
prospects of extrapolation, why 
could it not also be used to decide 
prospects of identifying causal 
effects? Doing so would render 
not just RCTs redundant but 
econometric methods more broadly.
Proposing the qualitative expertise 
of randomistas as a solution to the 
extrapolation problem also draws 
attention to another dangerous 
characteristic of their project: not 
only are RCTs placed at the top 
of a hierarchy of evidence, but 
randomistas seek to place them-
selves at the top of a hierarchy 
of knowledge (an ‘epistemic 
hierarchy’).
Of course, the privileging of 
economists’ views over others 
with arguably greater expertise is 
not a new phenomenon – in the 
past it has led to accusations of 
‘economics imperialism’. However, 
the promise of simple answers 
based on ‘scientific experiments’ 
combined with a well-funded push 
for influence marks the randomista 
project out as even worse in this 
respect than its predecessors.
Ideologically-infused 
experiments
Being at the top of a hierarchy of 
expertise is a sure way of securing 
policy influence, but there is no 
prima facie reason to believe that 
an American academic running an 
RCT has more knowledge of a local 
health system than, for instance, a 
competent doctor who has worked 
in that system for decades. Linked to 
this is a further problem with RCTs 
that has received little attention, 
but is profoundly important for 
developing countries seeking to 
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determine appropriate strategies and 
trajectories for social and economic 
development.4 The problem is this: 
the very choice of an intervention 
on which to base an RCT is itself the 
result of a pre-existing conception 
of how the world works and how it 
should work.
Consider the following example. A 
policymaker in the Busia district in 
Kenya is concerned about learning 
outcomes in state schools because 
a relatively small proportion of 
children attain basic competency 
in literacy and numeracy. The 
policymaker asks a randomista for 
assistance in improving outcomes 
and the randomista, naturally, 
proposes that an RCT, or multiple 
RCTs, be run to establish ‘what 
works’.5 But where does the 
intervention that will form the basis 
for the RCT come from?
One answer might be to say: ‘let 
us try something that appears to 
have worked elsewhere’. But this 
begs the question, since under the 
full absurdity of the randomista 
approach nothing can be said to 
have worked unless that is verified 
by the results of an RCT. Thus in 
the base case the randomista must 
draw an intervention from the 
set of interventions they believe 
might work.6
From a purely methodological 
perspective this is interesting 
because, as noted above, the 
methodological motive for the 
randomista project arose from 
scepticism of ex ante causal 
knowledge. Yet the mere choice of 
an intervention imposes researcher 
beliefs in at least three respects:
1. In determining the set of 
interventions that may work in 
theory.
2. Determining the subset of 1 
that are considered practically 
feasible. 
3. Prioritising the possibilities 
in order to select a single 
intervention or, at best, a 
handful of interventions.  
To focus on our chosen example, 
suppose that either the policymaker 
or the researcher has evidence of 
high teacher absenteeism and this 
is deemed to be a likely cause of 
poor outcomes. What experimental 
intervention might one institute? 
Researcher A who considers public 
employees in developing countries 
to be inherently lazy may favour 
a punitive incentive system based 
on increased monitoring. If that is 
practically infeasible because of 
resistance from teachers or other 
stakeholders, a reward-based 
system may be the next best option. 
On the other hand, Researcher B – 
who believes that under-resourcing 
and low-quality work environments 
negatively affect motivation – 
may propose an intervention that 
substantially increases school 
resources.
Notice that each researcher’s 
preferred experimental intervention 
may not even be in their counterpart’s 
set of possibly, or theoretically, 
effective interventions. That will 
also carry over to interpretation of 
the results of any RCT. Researcher 
A will interpret RCT evidence of 
ineffectiveness of a resource-based 
intervention as merely confirming 
what they already expected, while 
Researcher B may interpret it as 
reflecting the fact that increases 
in school resources may take time 
to have an impact. Similarly, B 
will interpret ineffectiveness of 
an incentive-based intervention as 
reflecting the fact that absenteeism 
is caused by other factors, while A 
may interpret it as reflecting a need 
to alter the design of the incentive 
mechanism.
The broader point is that there is 
nothing neutral about RCTs: the 
interventions chosen for testing 
are the outcome of decisions by 
researchers conducting experiments 
and institutions funding them, 
and will therefore reflect their 
preconceived notions of how the 
world works and what solutions 
should be considered plausible. 
Two examples from South 
Africa
Two specific examples from South 
Africa illustrate the salience of these 
arguments and the dangers of the 
randomista project for developing 
countries: the misleading use of 
an RCT to make the case for an 
employment tax incentive; and, 
the contribution of RCTs and 
their proponents to the continued 
neglect of systemic contributors to 
poor educational outcomes. Both 
examples are discussed extensively 
in separate articles.
The employment tax 
incentive: using an RCT to 
distort the policy debate 
In the mid-2000s the South African 
government invited a group of 
economists, subsequently known as 
‘the Harvard Group’, to advise on the 
country’s economic policy (Center 
for International Development 
2008). One proposal that emanated 
from this initiative was for an 
employment tax incentive aimed 
at reducing the extraordinarily 
high national unemployment rate 
(Levinsohn 2008). Underlying the 
proposal was a conceptualisation of 
unemployment as resulting, at least 
to a significant degree, from the 
price of labour being too high. That 
view had long been contested by 
trade unions, leading to a polarised 
situation involving academics 
siding with different vested 
interests: one side framed unions as 
seeking to privilege their members 
at the expense of the unemployed, 
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while the other side framed 
business as seeking to destroy 
collective action in order to better 
exploit workers. Unsurprisingly, 
the proposed tax incentive was 
opposed by trade unions.
The original analysis that 
had proposed the incentive 
acknowledged that the question 
of how responsive employment is 
to wages is an empirical one and 
that therefore more evidence was 
needed to substantiate any incentive 
and determine its characteristics. 
Although there was already 
some evidence that the National 
Treasury and many academics 
involved believed that an incentive 
was desirable, two studies were 
conducted in order to inform the 
decision: one was a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) analysis 
(Burns et al. 2010) and the other a 
randomised trial of a wage subsidy 
voucher given to job seekers. 
The nature of CGE studies is such 
that they effectively assume the 
answer to the primary question 
(‘would a publicly funded 
reduction in the wage causally 
increase employment?’) and model 
the sensitivity of outcomes to other 
assumptions; in that sense they are 
rather uninteresting, and unhelpful, 
for making the main policy 
decision, and I do not discuss that 
work further here.
The randomised trial was 
conducted by academics with 
links to the National Treasury and 
funding support from 3ie, which 
along with the Jamaal Abdul Latif 
Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) and 
Poverty Action, is one of the main 
international organisations funding 
the use of RCTs for development 
research. The ‘policy influence 
plan’ submitted to the funder 
(Unknown 2011) shows that the 
researchers anticipated unions as 
an obstacle to the impact of their 
findings – clearly expecting a 
positive result.
The working paper with the details 
of the study and its findings was 
only published after Parliament 
had approved the Employment 
Tax Incentive Bill (Levinsohn 
et al. 2014). However, prior to 
the decision the local researcher 
running the experiment published 
a number of articles in the popular 
press arguing for adoption of the 
incentive based on the positive 
findings of the study (Rankin 2012; 
2013). The National Treasury also 
cited the study in its presentation 
to Parliament. Yet parts of the full 
working paper that was published 
later are more cautious about what 
can be claimed, and scrutiny of the 
study details shows that the RCT 
provides little, if any, insight into 
the core policy question. 
Among the reasons why the claim 
that the RCT findings supported 
the implementation of the national 
incentive was false are: that the 
voucher intervention bore little 
resemblance to the intended 
incentive; the experimental popula- 
tion was not nationally represen-
tative; additional evidence did not 
support the claim that a lower wage 
was the mechanism behind the 
higher employment rate of voucher 
holders; and any positive effect 
could have been the consequence 
of a competitive effect among 
workers that would disappear when 
the intervention was scaled-up.
This example illustrates the points 
made in the preceding sections. The 
policy claims based on the RCT 
were not appropriate given the 
study’s limitations. Furthermore, 
the researchers showed clear 
bias in favour of the policy. One 
even worked for a consultancy 
company that provided services to 
labour brokers who would benefit 
directly from the incentive. Yet by 
leveraging the dubious scientism 
and epistemic authority associated 
with the randomista project, an 
RCT was used to endorse a policy 
that committed the government to 
billions of Rands of tax incentives 
for the private sector at a time 
when it was implementing fiscal 
consolidation.
RCTs and selective denial 
of systemic contributors to 
poor educational outcomes
Many of the studies cited in 
the 2019 Nobel award concern 
educational experiments. The vast 
majority of these are concerned 
with interventions that either do 
not materially increase  resources 
available to schools, or – as in 
the hiring of low paid contract 
teachers – do so in a manner that 
undermines the wages or power 
of incumbent teachers. This 
follows a longer tradition in the 
economics of education of denying 
or downplaying the relevance 
of fiscal resources (on the basis, 
incidentally, of econometric 
findings that are not credible by 
randomista standards).
Given that South African academic 
economics is largely an imitative 
enterprise (Muller 2017), it is 
unsurprising that both these stances 
have been reproduced locally. 
The researchers who currently 
dominate this policy space in 
South Africa produced a report on 
‘binding constraints in education’ 
that did not list resources as a 
binding constraint (van der Berg 
et al. 2016). This in a country 
regularly ranked the most unequal 
in the world, with high rates 
of unemployment, poverty and 
violence, and an education system 
for black South Africans that until 
1994 was infamously designed 
to produce ‘hewers of wood and 
drawers of water’.
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The justification for this remarkably 
extreme position is two-fold. First, 
one of the authors previously 
claimed that South African education 
expenditure was high relative to 
other countries (van der Berg 2007) 
and therefore resources could 
not be a cause of poor outcomes. 
Second, in studies done using non-
experimental econometric methods 
the authors and their collaborators 
apparently failed to find evidence 
that resources had a significant 
impact on outcomes. The view that 
resources are unimportant dovetails 
with a negative view of teachers, 
school management and trade 
unions: that it is not the inequities 
bequeathed by apartheid that cause 
poor educational outcomes, but 
merely inefficient management of 
adequate resources. 
RCTs fit neatly into this stance 
since, as has been the case interna-
tionally, they focus attention on 
non-structural issues, resource 
optimisation and deficit models 
of developing country civil 
servants. Unsurprisingly then, these 
researchers and their similarly-
minded collaborators in the 
Department of Basic Education 
have taken enthusiastically to these 
methods (even though acceptance 
of the randomista claim about 
credibility would render much of 
their prior work non-credible). 
Examples include poorly thought-
out interventions such as randomly 
sending study guides to schools in 
one province and then fishing for 
statistical significance (Taylor and 
Watson 2015), along with somewhat 
more carefully considered larger-
scale projects to test teacher training 
or early grade reading interventions. 
While the small group of researchers 
conducting these studies claim that 
the extrapolation problem is ‘[not] 
serious enough to call the method 
into question’ (Fleisch et al. 2017: 
10) it is evident that they do not have 
a grasp of the fundamental problem 
outlined above. It perhaps bears 
mentioning that given the current 
enthusiasm for RCTs, adopting this 
research method serves both the 
researchers’ academic publishing 
aspirations and desire for policy 
influence, regardless of whether it 
serves the public interest.
What has been particularly striking 
about the recent turn to RCTs in 
South African basic education 
policy is that educationalists 
and civil society activists who 
championed reading interventions 
for decades were ignored by 
government. But economists with 
little, if any, direct knowledge of the 
education system who advocated 
early grade reading interventions on 
the back of ‘scientific’ experiments 
rapidly got to the point of having 
their recommendations reproduced 
word-for-word in the President’s 
State of the Nation Address.7
Linked to this is how researchers 
who enhance their epistemic 
status using RCTs are also given 
more authority to inform policy 
using different methods to address 
separate policy questions on which 
other researchers may have greater, 
long-standing knowledge and 
expertise. This further compounds 
an arguably distorted epistemic 
hierarchy in which academics and 
others who draw expertise from 
research are given almost all the 
weight assigned to non-political 
inputs while ‘experts of prac- 
tice’ – such as teachers – are igno-
red except to the extent that their 
expertise is filtered through the 
former’s research, analysis and 
anecdote. And all of this, as with the 
employment tax incentive RCT that 
misled the public and policymakers, 
occurs under a broader narrative of 
‘evidence-based policy’.
RCTs as a dead-end
The main problem with the 
randomista project for those 
concerned with development, 
then, is not its methodological 
intolerance (Harrison 2013) per 
se. It is that an undue emphasis 
on RCTs for policy purposes 
is methodologically unsubs- 
tantiated, smuggles in ideological 
and epistemic bias, distracts from 
important questions and in doing 
all this diverts scarce intellectual 
resources and political will toward 
projects that will rarely deliver on 
even their narrow promises. The 
randomistas appear to be driven by 
a ‘missionary zeal’ (Bardhan 2013) 
that they are the chosen ones to save 
the denizens of developing countries 
from poverty with an ‘incredible 
certitude’ (Manski 2011) about 
their findings that is not warranted. 
And the combination poses a real 
danger to developing countries that 
have limited resources to resist a 
well-resourced project to determine 
their policies. 
Compounding this is that, as noted 
by many critics, the randomista 
project focuses both research and 
policy on narrow questions and 
interventions that lend themselves 
to RCTs, rather than on those that 
are most important for developing 
countries. The deliberate pursuit of 
medium and long-term structural 
change through a process of 
learning that has characterised the 
development paths of most now-
wealthy nations is outside the 
scope of the randomista project 
(see Chelwa, this issue). So, while 
there has been an attempt by 
randomistas to frame their stance as 
one of hope rather than pessimism 
regarding the prospects of major 
improvements in developing 
countries, that is disingenuous. The 
randomista project is premised, 
mostly implicitly but occasionally 
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explicitly, on a fundamental pessi- 
mism about developing countries 
achieving the economic improve-
ments of their predecessors.
Although the connections need to 
be elaborated in more detail, the 
randomista project can be seen as an 
extreme manifestation of imperia-
listic tendencies among economists 
premised on dubious claims about 
economics as a scientific activity. 
In that light, it is notable that 
even those who have endorsed 
the proclamation of a ‘credibility 
revolution’ have been silent about 
what this implies for all past policy 
advice by economists. If indeed it 
is true that RCTs are required for 
credible causal estimates then all 
past policy claims by economists 
using the implausible assumptions 
of other methods must have been 
inappropriate at best, or harmful 
at worst. The zealousness of the 
randomista project manifests itself 
in the argument that the hubris of 
economists that preceded it was 
fundamentally flawed but ‘this time 
is different’. Close scrutiny of the 
project suggests otherwise: ‘this 
time is worse’. 
For all the above reasons, I adopt a 
stronger stance than many critics of 
RCTs: not only will the widespread 
adoption and reliance on this 
method fail to yield the benefits 
promised by the randomista project, 
it is likely to hinder the attainment 
of long-term improvements in the 
prospects and well-being of the 
residents of developing countries. 
Properly located methodologically 
and epistemically, RCTs would 
play at most a small role in 
informing policy decisions of 
developing countries. If given the 
authority and power sought by 
the randomistas, RCTs will be a 
dead-end for African development. 
Whatever factors have hindered 
the attainment of greater progress 
in African countries since 
independence, there is no reason to 
believe that RCTs will address, or 
circumvent, those. The challenge 
for African countries remains to set 
out, as other countries have done 
historically, an alternative path 
to the new missionary complex 
that has congealed around the 
randomista project. 
Notes
1. For the sake of brevity and exposition 
I keep references to a minimum; more 
extensive references can be found 
in other work on which the present 
paper is based (Muller 2014b; 2014a; 
2015; 2020) and shorter versions 
of some of these arguments can be 
found in Chelwa and Muller (2019) 
and Chelwa, Hoffmann and Muller 
(2019a; 2019b).
2. This problem is widely referred to 
as the problem of ‘external validity’, 
following Cook and Campbell (1979) 
who contrasted it with the problem of 
identifying a causal effect (‘internal 
validity’). It is also referred to as the 
‘generalisability’ or ‘transportability’ 
problem.
3. In a forthcoming book chapter 
(Muller forthcoming) I discuss 
a range of efforts to address the 
problem, including replication and 
machine learning, and explain why 
they are inadequate.
4. There are some cogent critiques 
of popular conceptualisations of 
the notion of ‘development’ but I 
use the term in a broad, relatively 
unobjectionable manner here to refer 
to improve-ment in the well-being and 
prospects of those within a country 
– without requiring any particular 
presumption of what improvement 
might mean.
5. If the randomistas were to propose 
some other approach, presumably 
they would also need to suggest that 
someone else, who is actually an 
expert in that approach, be consulted.
6. In some places, randomistas have 
made much of their consultation 
with local partners in deciding what 
intervention to test. Aside from the 
fact that there is little independent 
evidence of this, it is quite clear even 
in such accounts that the researchers 
do not agree to run interventions 
that they believe are unlikely to be 
effective. Furthermore, the nature of, 
and rationale for, the vast majority of 
interventions is evidently economistic 
in nature.
7. And it is perhaps no coincidence 
that the dominant demographic in 
the former group were black women 
while the latter are predominantly 
white men trained at the university 
which was the intellectual heart of 
apartheid.
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Introduction
Climate services are broadly acknowledged to have the potential to support decision-
making and improve resilience 
to climatic shocks. Nevertheless, 
providing such services comes 
with several challenges such as 
the format, timing, costs, etc. In 
agriculture, climate services can 
help farmers to take informed 
production decisions such as the best 
timing of farming activities (e.g. 
sowing or planting and application 
of fertilisers or pesticides), type 
of seeds to use, etc. Despite this 
importance, there is limited high-
quality and rigorous evidence on 
how climate information could be 
provided to smallholder farmers. 
Against this backdrop, we tested 
the impact of climate services for 
smallholder farmers using mobile 
phones. We conducted a pilot 
theory-based experiment, using a 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) 
design that involved a treatment 
group and a control group with 
randomisation at the village level. 
Farmers in the treatment group were 
provided with weather information 
through a mobile phone Short 
Message Service (SMS). We used 
the exogenous variation created by 
the random assignment to estimate 
the impact of climate services on 
the farmers’ production decisions 
and performance. 
In sub-Saharan Africa smallholder 
farming systems that rely on rain-
fed agriculture remain the main 
source of livelihoods and food for 
most of the population. Changes 
in rainfall and temperature 
patterns are affecting agro-
climatic conditions with important 
alterations in the growing seasons 
(Ngaira 2007; Waha et al. 2013), the 
planting and harvesting calendars 
(Rosegrant et al. 2008; Waha et 
al. 2013), and processes such as 
evapotranspiration, photosynthesis 
and biomass production (Rosegrant 
et al. 2008). It is projected that 
crop yields in West Africa for 
instance might fall by about 10 to 
20 per cent by 2050 due to climate 
change (Thornton et al. 2002). Net 
crop revenue could fall further by 
about 90 per cent by 2100 (Boko 
et al. 2007). These impacts will 
exacerbate both food insecurity and 
poverty issues. 
Considering the reduction of 
climate change impacts, adaptation 
is now recognised as a key policy 
option (Kurukulasuriya and 
Mendelsohn 2008). In agriculture, 
farmers currently use several 
adaptation strategies that are well 
documented in the literature. 
Common strategies include crop 
diversification, the use of short 
cycle or drought-tolerant seed 
varieties, crop rotation and farming 
techniques such as adjustments of 
the timing of farm operations and 
the dosages of fertilisers (Abid, 
Schneider and Scheffran 2016; 
Assan et al. 2018; Below et al. 
2012; Bryan et al. 2009; Hassan and 
Nhemachena 2008; Hisali, Birungi 
and Buyinza 2011; Shepherd and 
Godwell 2019; Twagiramaria et al. 
2017; Yegbemey et al. 2013). Yet, 
the lack of adaptive capacities is 
one of the major limiting factors 
in smallholder farming systems 
(Waongo, Laux and Kunstmann 
2015). A good illustration is 
the lack of relevant climate-
related information to inform 
adaptation decisions. At the scale 
of the production systems, farmers 
typically shape their adaptive 
response to climate change based 
on their past weather knowledge 
and experience that form their 
expectations for future weather. 
While we strongly acknowledge the 
importance of farmers’ experience 
and endogenous knowledge, we 
argue that traditional weather 
forecast knowledge systems are now 
challenged with higher and higher 
levels of uncertainty about future 
variability. Previous studies (e.g. 
Roudier et al. 2014; Yegbemey et al. 
2014) found that providing farmers 
with relevant climate information is 
likely to help them to (better) shape 
their adaptive response. According 
to Douxchamps et al. (2016), 
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adaptation strategies to reduce 
smallholder farmers’ vulnerability 
to climate variability and seasonality 
are particularly needed in West 
Africa. However, there is still a 
paucity of policy-oriented research 
exploring innovative interventions 
to provide smallholder farmers with 
climate services. 
Within the framework of 
CODESRIA’s Making Research 
Initiative (MRI), we were awarded 
a research grant (MRI/CTR 7/2017) 
to conduct a study to explore ex 
ante the impact pathways of a 
hypothetical intervention which 
consists in providing smallholder 
farmers with weather-related 
information. Additionally, we 
design a pilot field experiment (i.e. 
an RCT) to analyse quantitatively 
the impact of weather forecasts 
(provided to smallholder farmers 
through a mobile phone SMS) on 
self-reported labour costs, yield 
and income. Our experiment was 
recently registered with the RCT 
ID AEARCTR-0005039 in the 
American Economic Association’s 
registry for RCTs. It is important 
to note that we wrote two research 
papers based on the current projects. 
Both papers are under review for 
publication by CODESRIA. 
Research design 
Our intervention consisted in 
providing climate-related informa-
tion through mobile phone SMS. 
Our targets are maize farmers that 
own a mobile phone and can read 
French or have someone in their 
household who can read French. 
The intervention was implemented 
by a local NGO, Bureau de 
Recherche et de Développement 
en Agriculture (BReDA). Using 
a mixed-methods approach, we 
designed a pilot theory-based 
RCT to test the impact of climate 
services for smallholder farmers 
on their production decisions (i.e. 
labour allocation) and performance 
(i.e. yield and income). RCTs are 
experimental approaches viewed 
as the most rigorous method 
to estimate the impact of an 
intervention when both internal 
and external validities are met. In 
a typical RCT, some people/units 
are allocated at random (by chance 
only) to receive the intervention 
whereas some people/units are also 
allocated at random to not receive 
the intervention. The former 
group of people is the treatment 
group and the latter group is the 
comparison or control group. The 
impact is assessed by comparing 
the average change in the outcome 
variables of interest (i.e. labour 
allocation, yield and farm income 
in our study) between the treatment 
and control groups. 
We conducted field work in six 
villages of the municipal area of 
Bembèrèkè in North Benin, West 
Africa. Villages were selected so 
that they are similar in terms of 
the importance of maize farming, 
production systems, maize 
production, average farm size, 
etc. To ensure this, agricultural 
extension officers were involved in 
the selection process. Furthermore, 
a field exploration visit was 
organised to confirm that the 
selected villages are actually similar. 
Following our RCT design, three 
villages (clusters) were randomly 
assigned to the treatment group 
(treatment villages) and the other 
three to the control group (control 
villages). Randomisation was 
conducted through a public lottery 
attended by representatives from all 
six villages. A total of 331 eligible 
and volunteer maize producers 
were randomly selected in the six 
villages. Farmers eligibility criteria 
include: a) farmers should be maize 
producers, b) farmers should plan 
to produce maize during the rainy 
season of 2017–18) farmers should 
own a mobile phone with a valid 
and functional line number, and 
d) farmers should have the ability 
to operate (i.e. read SMS) their 
mobile phone or have someone 
in the household who can do so. 
Following our design, farmers in 
villages assigned to the treatment 
group received the intervention 
whereas farmers in villages 
assigned to the control group 
received no intervention.
We conducted a baseline survey 
and an endline survey before and 
after the intervention respectively. 
In addition, we conducted a total of 
seven monthly follow-up surveys 
to collect monitoring data. Each 
data collection was designed as a 
household survey based on semi-
structured interviews, using a 
questionnaire pre-programmed 
in KoboCollect. Primary data 
collected include: a) farmers’ 
socio-economic characteristics 
such as location, gender, age, level 
of education, household size, main 
and secondary activities, contact 
with an extension agent, access 
to credit, etc.; b) treatment status 
(i.e. treatment versus control); 
c) production decisions such as 
inputs allocation; and d) inputs 
and output quantities and prices. 
Before the baseline survey, we 
conducted an extensive qualitative 
survey to understand better the 
possible impact pathways of the 
intervention. 
Impact pathways of weather 
information for smallholder 
farmers
We used a qualitative research 
design based on focus group 
discussions with smallholder 
farmers and agricultural extension 
officers to build a Theory of Change 
(ToC) of our intervention. By 
definition, a ToC is a description of 
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how a desired change is expected 
to happen in a particular context 
due to the intervention of interest. 
Our results support the premise 
that climate services have the 
potential to help farmers in taking 
informed production decisions. 
More specifically, we find that 
providing farmers with weather-
related information can help them 
better allocate production resources 
and eventually record higher yields 
and incomes. Farmers who enjoy 
these impacts might end up having 
better lives through improvements 
in their livelihoods. Our study 
suggests that several types of 
weather-related information can 
be useful for smallholder farmers. 
These include rainfall and wind 
forecasts. There are also several 
dissemination channels that can be 
used to provide famers with climate 
information, ranging from the social 
network of the local communities, 
to information and communication 
technologies. We show that each 
dissemination channel comes with 
both strengths and weaknesses. In 
that respect, we argue that the best 
dissemination channel will depend 
largely on the socio-economic 
context of the intervention area. 
Regardless of the socio-economic 
context of the intervention area, 
weather-related information needs 
to be accurate, available in a timely 
manner, understandable, and easy 
to use by smallholder farmers. 
Impact of weather-related 
information on labour costs, 
productivity and farm income 
Thanks to our pilot field experimen-
tal design, we compared the 
self-reported labour costs, yield 
and income between treatment 
and control farmers. Following 
the ToC of our intervention, we 
expect that farmers provided with 
weather-related information will 
better allocate their production 
resources and therefore record 
higher agricultural outputs. We 
acknowledge that our sample size 
is rather small and to account for 
this, we used three regression 
specifications: Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS); Generalized 
Estimating Equations (GEE) model 
with small sample correction; and 
Randomisation Inference (RI). 
The balance tests on the outcome 
variables and key co-variates at 
baseline show that the control and 
treatment groups are well balanced. 
Our impact estimates suggest that 
farmers in the treatment group 
record a lower level of labour 
costs but higher levels of yield 
and income. These patterns are 
consistent with our theoretical 
expectations. Furthermore, both the 
signs and the values of the impact 
estimates are consistent across 
the three regression specifications 
but significant with the RI model 
only (for labour costs and yield) or 
with the RI and GEE models (for 
income). 
Conclusion
There are several adaptation 
strategies mostly developed by 
smallholder farmers themselves 
or introduced by development 
agencies, government and/
or research institutions. These 
include new seed varieties, crop 
diversification, adjustments of 
the farming calendar, changes 
in input allocations and off-farm 
activities. While these adaptations 
could help adjustment to clear 
long-term changes in climate, 
they can show limitations as far 
as day-to-day weather variability 
is concerned. Considering that 
agricultural production is mostly 
seasonal, we acknowledge that 
adaptation to climate change is 
vital for smallholder farmers but 
adaptation to more uncertain 
climate variability is urgent. 
Through climate services, 
smallholder farmers can have 
access to weather information. 
Then, they can use the information 
to adjust farming practices. As this 
will be new to most rural areas, 
initiatives should engage with 
farmers to inform the main features 
of climate services such as the 
content, language, communication 
channels, timing, etc. As a matter 
of fact, our findings suggest that 
there are several options to design 
climate services and each option 
has strengths and weaknesses. 
Our field experiment shows that 
weather-related information 
through mobile phone SMS has 
positive impacts on labour, yield 
and income. Despite the pilot 
nature of our experiment, the 
findings will encourage researchers, 
practitioners and policy makers 
in their efforts to design and offer 
climate services for smallholder 
farmers. Yet, larger experiments are 
expected to generate more rigorous 
and high-quality evidence on the 
impact of climate services. 
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Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are now increasingly used in social 
policy and development as methods 
for identifying causal relationships. 
The recent win of the Nobel Prize 
in Economics by three development 
economists working on RCTs 
indicates ‘the rise of the evaluations 
and an acknowledgement for the 
approach to alleviating poverty’. 
Growing from the fields of 
medicine and clinical sciences, 
RCTs are now considered ‘the gold 
standard’ for evaluation on matters 
development. As governments 
and international organisations 
seek ways to understand causal 
questions related to development 
(Chelwa, Muller and Hoffmann 
2019a), so has the popularity of 
RCTs grown. Developing countries 
constitute the bulk of where 
development economists and non-
governmental organisations carry 
out experimental evaluations. In 
Kenya, international organisations 
including the Abdul Latif Jameel 
Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), an 
NGO associated with the Nobelists, 
have conducted a number of RCTs 
in rural and poor urban centres. 
The Busara Center for Behavioral 
Economics, a research and advisory 
firm, is another institution with 
offices in Kenya conducting RCTs 
in Africa. 
With increased enthusiasm for 
experimental models, questions 
and criticisms abound. It is unclear 
for example how RCTs solve the 
problems of poverty, a claim made 
during the presentation of the 
2019 Nobel Prize. Also, it remains 
unclear how governments adopt 
or scale-up policy prescriptions 
arising from RCTs to national level. 
Other areas of criticisms include 
levels of informed consent (see 
Hoffmann, this issue), conflicts 
of interest (Hoffmann 2018), and 
on methodological limitations 
of the experiments (see Muller 
2015). Another level of criticism 
of RCTs involves the perception 
of participants in the experiments, 
an area to which little attention has 
been paid. 
Between 2014 and 2016, Give-
Directly, an American NGO, 
conducted a randomised experiment 
which involved giving lump-sum 
amounts of cash in Western Kenya 
in Homa Bay and Siaya counties. 
A one-off unconditional cash 
transfer of up to US$1000 was 
paid to households in the counties 
through mobile money transfer. 
Unconditional cash transfers do 
not require households to perform 
certain specified behaviour to 
qualify for transfers. Households 
and individuals receiving the money 
and are at liberty to use it as deemed 
appropriate. Governments and 
aid organisations are increasingly 
adopting cash transfers as poverty 
reduction instruments, and the use 
of cash in humanitarian situations 
in on the rise too. This essay 
derives from anecdotal sentiments 
expressed by community members 
in Oyugis in Homa Bay County, 
Kenya. On one of my visits to 
Oyugis, discussions were ongoing 
in the village about the programme. 
An aspect that struck me in the 
conversations was that community 
members were refusing to take 
cash from the organisation and 
urging others not to take money. 
Why would people refuse to take 
free money from GiveDirectly 
when as organisations reports ‘cash 
transfers have been thoroughly and 
rigorously shown to reduce poverty 
and improve lives’? GiveDirectly 
reports the refusal in a blog on their 
website thus; “As it turns out these 
challenges have been common for 
NGOs working in the area. Other 
development programs…. have 
also faced community resistance” 
(https://www.givedirectly.org/
refusals-in-kenya/) suggesting that 
resistance is characteristic of that 
particular county and not to the 
programme. However, refusal to 
participate in such programmes is 
not peculiar to Homa Bay County, 
as GiveDirectly reports of a similar 
incidence in Malawi (see https://
www.givedirectly.org/why-one-
village-refused-funds/) where 
community members refused 
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to participate in a cash transfer 
experiment and only did so after the 
intervention of  the local officials. 
Having previously worked in 
social protection and cash transfer 
policy spaces, my interest was 
to understand the perceptions of 
the community that had accepted 
government cash transfers on the 
one hand but on the other refused 
to take cash payments from 
GiveDirectly. Also, why would 
people reject large cash transfers, 
when GiveDirectly was claiming it 
was overwhelmingly beneficial? 
At the fore of these discussions 
are the community’s perception on 
randomisation, and themes of trust 
and legitimacy. The first section of 
the essay is a brief discussion of 
cash transfers and randomisation 
followed by a section on the 
community’s perception of 
randomisation. The subsequent 
section is on perceptions of trust 
and legitimacy. 
Cash transfer revolution 
and randomisation: a match 
made in heaven
Randomisation involves allocation 
of a treatment to some members of 
a group and comparing the results 
of the treatment with a control 
group – those not receiving the 
treatment – to determine the causal 
effect. Randomised experiments 
conducted in Kenya include a 
wide range of topics including the 
evaluation of teacher attendance, 
the allocation of study materials, the 
provision of mosquito nets, water 
treatment pills, and deworming, 
amongst others. With the rise 
of cash transfers up the global 
development agenda, a new frontier 
of experiments has opened up. The 
idea of giving cash to individuals 
and households – conditional or 
unconditional, through a means 
test or universal – is considered 
revolutionary by its proponents. 
Cash transfers have been described 
by some as ‘the silver bullet out 
of poverty’ prompting their rise 
up the development discourse in 
the global South. The Government 
of Kenya with the United Nations 
Children Fund (UNICEF) initiated 
the Cash Transfer for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) 
in 2003 as a response to the HIV/
AIDs pandemic. Other cash 
transfer schemes, initiated with 
financial support and advocacy 
of international organisations, 
including the World Bank and the 
UK Department for International 
Development (DfID), are the 
Hunger Safety Net Programme, 
the Persons with Severe Disability 
Programme, and the Older Persons 
Cash Transfer Scheme. Other 
African countries have equally 
adopted cash transfers with each 
country on the continent now 
implementing a cash transfer 
scheme of some sort or other. 
However, most programmes are not 
homegrown but initiated through 
powerful advocacy, soft power and 
dominant structural mechanisms 
(Ouma and Adésínà 2019).
With the rise of cash transfers a 
fresh avenue for randomisation 
has opened up. Both RCTs and 
cash transfers are now hegemonic 
in social policy and development 
discourse in the global South driven 
by international organisations and 
national proponents. Randomisation 
of cash transfers is now used to 
evaluate a broad range of aspects 
from health and educational 
outcomes, girls’ sexual debut, 
happiness and jealousy, to conflict 
and violence. As Hoffmann (2020) 
points out policy experiments are 
rooted in historical backgrounds of 
colonial experimentations in Africa. 
Both cash transfer and policy 
experiment proponents derive 
from the idea of the ‘white saviour’ 
with international organisations 
claiming to provide solutions to 
the development challenges on 
the continent. With the popularity 
of randomisation of cash transfers 
the interaction of the two can only 
be described as a ‘match made in 
heaven’.
Community perceptions on 
randomisation
By randomising, each member of a 
selected sample in the experiment 
has an equal chance of selection 
to receive treatment. To the 
community in Homa Bay County, 
the selection of beneficiaries 
seemed ‘random’ hence they could 
not understand how beneficiaries 
of the cash transfer were selected. 
Similar to findings on community 
perspectives from Zambia (Kombe 
et al., 2019) it was unclear to 
members of the community if the 
programme was aid or research. 
Stemming from the association 
of the provision of items and 
cash transfers as aid, there was 
confusion about the ‘eligibility’ 
of beneficiaries. The community’s 
understanding is that cash transfer 
payments are made to poor and 
vulnerable households meeting 
certain criteria like orphanhood, 
disability or old age. In the 
community’s understanding cash 
transfers are therefore provided 
to certain categories of people 
for their instrumental value of 
poverty alleviation and prevention 
of destitution. Expectations were 
that poverty and vulnerability 
would mark eligibility and not 
some ‘random’ criteria that 
enabled the selection of those 
considered ineligible according to 
the community’s standards. The 
exclusion of those considered the 
poorest, such as street families, 
from cash transfers also heightened 
confusion over the objectives of the 
cash transfer experiment. 
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With lack of clarity on the eligibility 
criteria, members of the community 
attempted to contextualise the 
experiment. While selection into 
the government cash transfer 
schemes is somewhat clear, based 
on orphanhood, age and visible 
disability, with little clarity on 
the experiment by GiveDirectly, 
community members branded the 
programme a devil-worshipping 
enterprise. To the community, 
none of the considerations for 
eligibility for cash transfer made 
sense, as both the well-off and the 
poor were included and left out, 
providing room for speculation 
that beneficiaries were being 
enrolled into an evil scheme. It 
was expected that misfortune 
would befall those who accepted 
the money. And unlike in other 
experiments where those receiving 
provisions may have negative 
feelings of jealousy and envy, this 
was not the case with community 
members seeking to disassociate 
from those who had been enrolled 
in the scheme. In settings such as 
rural Western Kenya, where norms 
of neighbourliness, solidarity 
and community resilience remain 
strong, randomisation may be 
counteractive to these social norms.
On trust and legitimacy: ‘the 
government we know’
Besides the objective of the 
experiment, community members 
questioned the provision, in this 
case, money, and the amount 
paid out to beneficiaries. In some 
communities such as among the 
Luo (the people of Siaya and Homa 
Bay counties) money offered by 
strangers is treated with suspicion 
which further emboldened false 
speculations of devil worshipping 
and witchcraft. Often, a stranger 
giving money ‘just like that’ 
raises suspicions amongst people. 
Happenings, like houses burnt in 
Siaya County, where others had 
received cash were linked to the 
cash transfer experiment. With 
rumours spreading about the ‘devil-
worshipping’ outfit, community 
members sent word around 
telling others to reject the money. 
Distribution of goods often raises 
questions across communities and 
the distribution of money is bound 
to be more contentious especially 
when information is unclear.
Trust, or a lack thereof, was a factor 
in the experiment. Although native 
speakers of Dholuo formed part of 
the identification and registration 
team for the experiment, 
community members considered 
the organisation foreign. Asked 
why they would take money 
from government and not from 
GiveDirectly, a community member 
stated: ‘the government we know, 
but this organisation we do not 
know’. The statement demonstrates 
the mistrust community members 
have with ‘strangers’, be it for 
experiments or service provision. 
In addition, it points to the 
acknowledgement by community 
members of the role of state in 
social provision despite the roll-
back and erosion of state capacity 
in social policy provision. While 
not all members of the community 
receive cash transfers from the state, 
the government is the agency they 
interact with in some form of the 
other – through law enforcement, 
collection of market tax, provision 
of educational and health services, 
or for relief through cash or in-kind 
transfers.
Manufacturing legitimacy – 
resources and expertise
With globalisation, policy 
spaces are now proliferated with 
more actors – both national and 
transnational. Along with the 
multiplicities of actors in the 
policy arena are questions of 
legitimacy. Legitimacy concerns 
those mandated through law or 
norms to carry out certain activities 
and initiatives. National actors 
like politicians have veto powers 
mandating them to participate in 
policy processes while government 
works hold bureaucratic mandates. 
While international organisations, 
unlike domestic actors, may lack 
veto power or bureaucratic power 
to carry out some programmes, 
organisations like GiveDirectly 
draw their legitimacy from the 
resources they hold. In the case of 
the cash transfer experiment, the 
resources they bring into the policy 
space are finance and knowledge. 
Support and financial resources 
from heavyweight organisations in 
development like USAID, and the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
provided additional legitimacy to 
GiveDirectly. 
In addition, their international 
orientation from developed 
countries is perceived by some 
to be a marker of expertise. The 
resources they possess allow 
them to penetrate and bypass 
government bureaucracies to 
conduct experiments, engage in 
policymaking processes and even 
in some cases implement policies 
on their own with disregard for 
existing structures. Like other social 
policy experiments, GiveDirectly 
eschewed government structures 
and institutions and instead set up 
separate structures. Interaction and 
recognition of other government 
cash transfer schemes are minimal 
in papers or reports of the 
organisation. The idea of ‘directly 
giving cash’ is depicted as novel. 
The ‘creation’ of novel ideas further 
provides international organisations 
with the legitimacy of expertise.  
Besides disregard for existing 
institutions, another mechanism 
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that experimenters use to enhance 
their legitimacy is a process 
of depoliticisation (Ouma and 
Adésínà, 2019). The process 
involves keeping away political 
elites from the programmes by 
portraying the policy experiment 
as technical. Like organisations 
that promoted the adoption of cash 
transfers in Kenya, GiveDirectly 
limited interaction with political 
elites and sought to keep them 
out of the experiments. The guise 
is that bringing politicians into 
the programmes will mess up the 
programmes as they will fall under 
patronage politics (Mkandawire, 
2015). However, such assertions 
aim at delegitimising the role 
of politicians in policymaking 
decisions while providing space 
for international organisations 
to conduct experiments with 
disregard for political economy 
realities. By avoiding interaction 
with considerations related to 
political economy – which matter in 
policymaking – policy prescriptions 
arising from the evaluations can 
sometimes be less meaningful 
(Das 2020). Also, by depoliticising 
social policy experiments, policy 
uptake or scale-up is compromised 
since it is politicians that allocate 
budgets to programmes and 
policies. As Drèze, (2020) notes, 
while evidence is a scientific 
matter, policy is a political decision 
and therefore inherently political. 
Depoliticisation therefore is 
counterproductive to experiments 
aimed at informing policy 
decisions.
Moreover, even as experiments are 
conducted to inform policy uptake, it 
is unclear from RCTs in Kenya how 
and to what extent the government 
has adopted recommendations 
from the policy experiments. NGOs 
cannot scale-up programmes to the 
national level, and experiments, 
while conducted by NGOs, are 
expected to be scaled-up or 
adopted by governments. From 
the GiveDirectly experiment in 
Siaya and Homa Bay counties, 
it remains unclear how the 
experiment would inform policy 
considering the government was 
already providing regular cash 
payments to various categories 
of the population. Furthermore, 
controlled experiments present a 
skewed interpretation of reality 
making it difficult for governments 
to draw policy lessons. Experiments 
by international organisations and 
NGOs are conducted in near perfect 
conditions which are artificial 
constructed (Ravallion 2020). They 
may involve the expenditure of 
large amounts of money, expensive 
technology, well trained staff and 
other resources not at the disposal 
of governments. Scaling-up or 
adopting policy prescriptions from 
the experiments present challenges 
to governments. Considering the 
amount of transfers made in Homa 
Bay and Siaya counties, it would be 
impossible for the Government of 
Kenya to match the amount in the 
experiment. And as government 
agencies in the experiments are 
limited, policy uptake from the 
experiments may not interest 
policymakers. Moreover, policy 
prescriptions from the experiments 
may be misaligned to national plans 
or be inimical to national social 
policy needs (Hoffmann 2018).   
Additional thoughts
For long Africa has been a site of all 
sorts of experiments. Africa offers 
an ideal location for experiments due 
to structural deficiencies in regula- 
tion on research protocols 
which organisations conducting 
experiments may exploit to conduct 
experiments that may be harmful 
or unethical (Hoffmann 2018), 
and for experiments that cannot be 
conducted in countries where the 
promoters of the RCTs originate. 
Sometimes the experiments have 
little to do with the sites where 
they are conducted but present 
researchers with opportunities for 
publication. Experiments testing 
whether giving cash to the poor 
makes improvements to their 
lives, for example, are a priori, as 
improvement in the financial means 
of a household mostly enhances 
quality of life. Of course, people 
are happier when they receive 
cash (Egger et al. 2019) – and this 
needs no randomised controlled 
experiment to demonstrate. 
As Kabeer (2020) notes, 
publications related to RCTs 
rarely report crucial details about 
the challenges and what deviates 
from research design. This brings 
into the discussion questions 
about the transparency of the 
policy prescriptions that arise from 
the experiments – prescriptions 
which may be harmful to well-
being in Africa (see Muller, this 
issue). Besides the lack of veto 
power discussed above, most 
international organisations engaged 
in development work on the 
continent, particularly on RCTs and 
cash transfers, also lack legitimacy 
with the people. Their actions may 
therefore undermine social norms 
of reciprocity and community 
resilience (Adésínà 2011), as most of 
experiments conducted draw from 
policy prescriptions which seek to 
strength individual resilience rather 
than build on existing community 
support and resilience. Success for 
the experiments relies on personal 
testimony of change, and ‘before 
and after’ narratives (see https://
live.givedirectly.org/)  rather than 
changes to structural barriers that 
perpetuate poverty. 
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Transitional justice interventions, 
particularly in Africa, have failed. In 
this context, there is a growing interest 
in tradition-based community-led 
practices for resolving justice. Yet 
little is known or understood about 
these practices on their own terms, 
and what role they play in transitional 
justice on the continent. This volume 
challenges some of the underlying 
assumptions of current responses to mass violence on the continent, including the way these are 
embedded in state-centricism and an international justice system that lacks relevance in relation to the 
day-to-day realities of rural African communities. Through the case studies of Zimbabwe, Burundi and 
Mozambique the volume explores some of the limitations and possibilities with regard to justice during 
transitions.  
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